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Abstract
This article answers why intra-executive conflict varies across semi-presidential democracies. The litera-
ture verifies that intra-executive competition tends to be higher when the president holds less power to
dismiss the cabinet, coexists with a minority government, or the president’s party is not represented in the
cabinet. This paper, therefore, integrates these factors to construct an index of prime ministerial autonomy,
proposing that its relationship with the probability of intra-executive conflict is represented by an inverted
U-shaped curve. That is, when the prime minister is subordinated to an elected president, or conversely,
enjoys greater room to manoeuvre in the executive affairs of the government, the likelihood of conflict is
low. In contrast, significant confrontation emerges when the president claims constitutional legitimacy to
rein in the cabinet, and controls the executive to a certain degree. This study verifies hypotheses using data
on seventeen semi-presidential democracies in Europe between 1990 and 2015.
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Introduction
Semi-presidentialism is a system of government where a popularly elected president exists alongside
a prime minister (PM) and cabinet who are collectively responsible to the legislature (Elgie, 1999).
The coexistence of popularly elected presidents and PMs often leads to a gridlock situation under
which both actors are not willing to compromise or cooperate. This is because competing legitima-
cies built into such systems cause the dual executives to claim that they are truly representative of the
citizens through direct presidential election or parliamentary support, respectively, and thus lay the
grounds for potential conflict between the president and the PM. However, semi-presidential de-
mocracies exhibit considerable variation in the chances of intra-executive conflict. Intra-executive
coexistence has proven to be peaceful in Ireland compared to most regimes in the post-communist
region (Elgie, 2017). A substantial variation in the patterns of intra-executive relationships among
semi-presidential regimes has persisted over the first (Protsyk, 2005a; Protsyk, 2006) and second
post-communist decades (Sedelius and Ekman, 2010; Sedelius and Mashtaler, 2013). This variation
begs the question: under what circumstances do dual executives opt for open confrontation?
There is a substantial body of literature devoted to examining the phenomenon of intra-
executive conflict in semi-presidential regimes by comparing constitutional heterogeneity and po-
litical circumstances of semi-presidential systems (Protsyk, 2005a; Protsyk, 2006; Sedelius and
Mashtaler, 2013; Elgie, 2017). Several points merit further discussion. First, the literature identifies
a too broad (Elgie, 2017) or too narrow (Protsyk, 2005a; Protsyk, 2006; Sedelius and Mashtaler,
2013) scope of constitutional presidential power as a critical source of variation in the political
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control of semi-presidential cabinets. Second, few studies have identified the specific conditions
under which cohabitation has an impact on intra-executive conflict (Protsyk, 2005a; Protsyk,
2006; Sedelius and Mashtaler, 2013).1 Third, scholars have failed to propose a comparative frame-
work for integrating presidents’ motivation and ability to act or to analyse their role in intra-
executive conflict.
This paper proposes that the chances of intra-executive confrontation are shaped by the au-
thority that the constitution grants to the president to pose a threat to the survival of the govern-
ment and his motivation to exercise that authority. Both factors jointly influence the extent to
which the PM determines the executive affairs of the government without presidential interven-
tion. I have, thus, defined and constructed an index of prime ministerial autonomy, proposing that
its relationship with the probability of intra-executive conflict is represented by an inverted U-
shaped curve. That is, when the PM is subordinated to an elected president, or conversely, enjoys
greater room for manoeuvring in the executive affairs of the government, the conflict-likelihood is
low. In contrast, significant confrontation emerges when the president claims constitutional le-
gitimacy to rein in the cabinet and controls the executive to a certain degree. This study verifies
the hypotheses using data on 187 cabinets in seventeen semi-presidential democracies in Europe
between 1990 and 2015.
The work speaks to several central studies in comparative politics. First, this paper argues that
the effects of cohabitation on the chances of an intra-executive conflict depend on the president’s
ability to threaten the government to act on his behalf, thus contributing to existing research on
the link between cohabitation and intra-executive conflict (Protsyk, 2005a; Protsyk, 2006; Sedelius
and Mashtaler, 2013; Elgie, 2017). Second, this paper adds to the richness of existing scholarship
on the relationship between the president’s ability to act and his constitutional powers (Protsyk,
2005a; Neto and Strøm, 2006; Protsyk, 2006; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2009b, 2010; Sedelius
and Mashtaler, 2013; Elgie, 2017), implying that the PM’s willingness to compromise and coop-
erate increases with presidential influence over cabinet survival. Third, the paper integrates the
study of the risk of early government termination across different forms of semi-presidential
regimes (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2009a; Sedelius and Ekman, 2010; Kim, 2015; Fernandes
and Magalhães, 2016; Yan, 2018), proposing that in addition to cabinet dismissal power, the presi-
dent can pose a threat to the very survival of the government through the use of assembly disso-
lution powers or a proposed parliamentary vote of no confidence by his or allied parties. Finally,
this study defines and develops an index of prime ministerial autonomy, contributing to a com-
parative study of measures of cabinet termination power by capturing the multiple steps in the
termination processes (Goplerud and Schleiter, 2016).
Prime ministerial autonomy and intra-executive conflict
Prime ministerial autonomy is defined as the extent to which the PM determines the executive
affairs of the government without presidential intervention. There are two parts to this definition.
First, the ‘prime minister’ mentioned here does not refer to the PM itself. This is because cabinet
ministers may determine policy outcomes within their respective domains (Laver and Shepsle,
1996) and a largely accommodative agenda is pursued if the government is composed of multiple
parties (Warwick, 1999; Martin, 2004; Martin and Vanberg, 2014), thus setting limits on prime
ministerial discretion. The first part of the definition, instead, regards the ‘prime minister’ as one
head of the dual executive of a semi-presidential system, that is, a PM heading a cabinet subject to
assembly confidence.
Second, semi-presidentialism often generates dual-legitimacy problems, which means that both
the president and the PM have competing claims to constitutional legitimacy. A popularly elected
1The situation in which the president is from one party and the prime minister is from the other one, but where the pres-
ident’s party is absent from government is known as “cohabitation” (Elgie, 2011b).
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president derives power from the vote of the people, while a PM leading the government relies on
the support of the parliament, which claims to be the citizens’ true representative. Protsyk (2005a)
explained that popular elections often provide justifications for the president’s willingness to rein
in the cabinet, intervene in the sphere where the president’s formal or informal power is exercised
and, thus, control the executive to a certain degree. There are many ways for presidential inter-
vention, such as drawing on assembly dissolution power to threaten the government to act in the
president’s best interest (Jalali, 2011) or influencing cabinet decisions through invoked public
opinion (Neto and Lobo, 2009) combined with their perceived prestige of standing above party
politics, especially in a personality-centred political culture (Raunio and Sedelius, 2019). When the
chances of presidential intervention in the PM’s areas of responsibility are higher, the extent to
which the PM determines the executive affairs of the government of his free will is lower. Thus, the
second part of the definition, namely, that the PM ‘determines the executive affairs of the gov-
ernment without presidential intervention’, implies that ‘presidential intervention’ determines this
type of autonomy.
Intra-executive conflict is defined as a political competition between the president and the PM
over the control of political resources available to the executive (Protsyk, 2005a; Protsyk, 2006;
Sedelius and Ekman, 2010; Sedelius and Mashtaler, 2013). In essence, intra-executive relations
are a game where two political actors scramble for a larger share of the pie, especially for that
which is not explicitly stipulated by formal procedures on who gets the residual share. As a result,
both sides either attempt to change the formal distribution of power or use the existing power to
move policy or personnel appointments closer to their ideals (Protsyk, 2005a; Protsyk, 2006), thus
grabbing a bigger share of the pie.
If this were the case, it would mean that intra-executive competition is rare when one head of
the dual executive determines and regulates government activity with his own free will without the
other head’s involvement in, for example, economic policy or social affairs. There are two possi-
bilities where one head determines the executive affairs of the government without the other
head’s intervention in the sphere of his personal policy interest. One possibility is that the PM
can exercise nearly full autonomy over policy-making or personnel appointments. In this situa-
tion, the president will not exercise any control over the government and the PM acts as the head
of government. For instance, in Austria after 1945, Iceland after 1944, and Ireland after 1937,
directly elected presidents were introduced in a context where the incumbent was expected
to be a figurehead (Elgie, 2011a) and in practice, the presidents were hardly involved in their
governments’ day-to-day business.
The other possibility is that the president enjoys greater room to manoeuvre in executive affairs
and the PM is subordinated to the elected president; in other words, the extent to which the PM
can determine the executive affairs of the government is very low. Russia is a case where the pres-
ident is clearly the dominant figure, and in practice, the presidential features of the Russian semi-
presidential system appear to have dominated (Baylis, 1996). After 1993, it was the presidency that
defined the character of the political system, as Yeltsin used his ascendancy after the dissolution of
the parliament to create a constitution that extended his already considerable powers and under
which, the PM and his cabinet were completely dependent on the president (White, 1999). For
example, Yeltsin could change PMs without providing any explanation, thereby devaluing the post
of PM and turning the government into a puppet (Shevtsova and Eckert, 2000).
In contrast, significant tension brews when a president tries to exercise influence over a PM
with significant power to advance his or her own agenda. On one hand, the president claims to
represent the will of the people and attempts to influence the government’s day-to-day business.
Romanian President Traian Băsescu proposed a reform of the political system through referen-
dums (Gallagher and Andrievici, 2008: 154); Polish President Lech Kaczyński used his veto power
to reject much of the legislation drafted by the government from an attempt to reform inefficient
pension systems to a bill restructuring state television (Cienski, 2010). In each instance, the presi-
dent wanted to make his voice heard in the policy-making process. On the other hand, the
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president is not equipped with sufficient constitutional weapons to subordinate the PM, leaving
the PM with some room to manoeuvre. For instance, Romanian PM Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu,
through his ruling party, the National Liberal Party, and four allied parties in the parliament,
launched an impeachment procedure against Băsescu’s unconstitutional conduct (Gherghina
and Hein, 2016). Polish PM Donald Tusk, through his ruling party, Civic Platform, prepared
a Constitutional Amendment stripping the country’s president of his veto power and granting
the PM and his cabinet members exclusive power to represent Poland at the EU summit
(Polskie Radio, 2010). As a result, both sides intended to be in the driving seat, leading to conflict
when the extent to which the PM manages the government’s day-to-day business independently
falls into the middle range.
In sum, I propose that the relationship between the extent to which the PM determines the
executive affairs of the government without presidential intervention and the probability of
intra-executive conflict is represented by an inverted U-shaped curve.
Motivation, ability and intra-executive conflict
This paper has thus far argued that (1) presidential intervention is the determinant of the extent to
which the PM determines the government’s day-to-day politics, and (2) the relationship between
prime ministerial autonomy and intra-executive conflict is represented by an inverted U-shaped
curve. This section explores the factors that influence presidential intervention in the executive
affairs of the government and its relationship with intra-executive conflict, and proposes that the
key factor is the president’s motivation and ability.
When the president is not interested in determining and regulating government activity, allow-
ing the PM to manage the government’s day-to-day business independently, the level of conflict is
low. In contrast, a more active presidential intervention leads both sides to scramble for control
over the executive branch of the government.
It seems that the PM engages in open conflict with the president when the head of state intends
to impose limits on his decision-making freedom. However, it may not be true if the PM will bear
considerable costs after deciding to challenge the president’s authority. In other words, the
president’s ability to turn open confrontation into political suicide for the PM determines whether
intra-executive conflict emerges. When the president can ensure the PM’s compliance with his
decision, intra-executive relations appear less prone to conflict. In contrast, intra-executive rela-
tions are marked by rivalry if the president is unable to secure the PM’s compliance and
cooperation.
Thus, conflict is more likely when the president has sufficient motivation to intervene, but lacks
the ability to dominate the PM. This situation is the extent to which the PM independently deter-
mines the executive affairs of the government at the mid level. Instead, conflict is rare in semi-
presidential regimes, where the president has neither the inclination nor the ability to get involved
in decision-making processes due to greater prime ministerial autonomy, or where the president
dominates the executive leaving the PM with very limited room to manoeuvre. Figure 1 shows the
predicted relationship.
Cohabitation, power and intra-executive conflict
Although this predicted relationship has a theoretical basis, it seems to be empirically implausible
for a direct measurement of the president’s motivation and ability. This section, thus, proposes that
political orientation of the dual executives and the presidential influences over the cabinet’s survival
jointly determine whether the president intervenes in the executive affairs of the government.
Cohabitation increases the likelihood of intra-executive conflict (Protsyk, 2005a; Protsyk, 2006;
Sedelius and Mashtaler, 2013; Elgie, 2017). It is reasonable to expect that the different ideological
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orientations of both executives provide justifications for a presidential intervention because the
head of state tries to move policy positions closer to his ideal point and, thus, increases the in-
centive for intra-executive competition. In other words, a lower consensus between the president
and the government coalition creates an incentive for presidents to assert their influence (Tavits,
2008). Existing research points out that during a period of cohabitation, the president is more
likely to veto legislation and request a judicial review of bills by the Constitutional Court
(Köker, 2017), or get involved in cabinet appointments (Neto and Strøm, 2006), or in other words,
presidential activism arises. However, these seminal works cannot explain cases of peaceful intra-
executive relations during the period of cohabitation.
Scholars identify the specific conditions under which cohabitation affects intra-executive con-
flict (Lazardeux, 2015; Elgie, 2017). Lazardeux’s (2015) study of the impact of cohabitation on
policy-making in France indicates that electoral incentives determine action on the part of the
PM during the cohabitation period. When the PM is optimistic about winning the presidency,
he or she will avoid harmful intra-executive conflicts and public criticism by the president,
thereby, reducing the number of significant new laws. Conversely, when the PM is less considered
a president-in-waiting, the government would be eager to increase the number of enacted signifi-
cant laws, thus increasing the potential for intra-executive conflict. However, the study was limited
by only including three cases of cohabitation. Further, the PM who is unoptimistic about winning
the presidency does not necessarily push for significant reforms when the president is equipped
with enough constitutional weapons to subordinate the PM. Thus, the president’s ability to
threaten the government to act on his behalf is the determinant of such a conflict.
Figure 1. The predicted relation between motivation, ability, prime ministerial autonomy, and intra-executive conflicts and
their empirical implications.
Source: the author.
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Elgie’s (2017) study shows that cohabitation, along with the extent of presidential powers, has a
direct impact on the level of intra-executive conflict. That is, intra-executive conflict arises
when the president exercises power against a government that cannot support his or her inter-
ests under the period of cohabitation. However, the likelihood of confrontations between both
executives may not increase with presidential power because the president can, through the
use of dismissal powers, pose a direct threat to the government’s survival and, thus, increase
their willingness to compromise and cooperate. In other words, it seems reasonable to expect
conflict to be more frequent when the PM is not afraid of the president’s threat and the
president has intentions to intervene in the executive affairs of the government. Thus, the
president’s ability to coerce the government to act on his behalf is crucial, and aggregate meas-
ures of presidential powers may not be appropriate.
From a principal–agent perspective, in semi-presidential regimes, voters delegate to two agents,
the president and parliament, that acts as the principal of the PM and his cabinet (Schleiter and
Morgan-Jones, 2009b). Compared to premier–presidential regimes, president–parliamentary sys-
tems provide presidents with cabinet dismissal powers that help to control cabinet survival
(Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2009a; Sedelius and Ekman, 2010) and prime ministerial turnover
(Kim, 2015) and, accordingly, increase prime ministerial incentives not to challenge the presi-
dents’ requests, but rather to comply (Protsyk, 2006). Furthermore, the choice of the PM is
much closer to the ideal point of presidents with cabinet dismissal power (Protsyk, 2005b).
Consequently, intra-executive conflict is rare in president–parliamentary regimes (Protsyk,
2005a; Protsyk, 2006; Sedelius and Mashtaler, 2013).
The author agrees that cabinet dismissal power is an effective weapon to threaten
the government, but disagrees that presidential influence on government termination
only hinges on such power. In fact, the president, in all probability, secures the PM’s com-
pliance through the use of assembly dissolution powers and parliamentary votes of no
confidence.
There is a higher possibility that PMs align closely with presidents that have assembly disso-
lution powers because cabinet survival relies on presidential decisions (Fernandes and Magalhães,
2016). For instance, Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio discouraged PM Durão Barroso from
sending troops to Iraq in 2003 by threatening to use his assembly dissolution power, a case of
a ‘legislative’ use of the power of dissolution (Jalali, 2011).
A full understanding of presidential influence on the termination of the government should
focus on the other dimension of choice, namely a parliamentary vote of no confidence. First,
in all forms of semi-presidentialism, the government must be accountable to the legislature.
The government’s dependence on parliamentary support means that compulsory resignation
happens if the government is deemed by a majority of the members of parliament as no longer
fit to govern. Second, although the parliament is granted such power, the president can,
through his party or an allied party in the parliament, initiate a motion of no confidence, thus
putting the government’s survival at risk. For example, Moldovan President Mircea Snegur
concluded an alliance with the Popular Front Forces and called on a parliamentary vote of
no confidence against PM Andrei Sangheli who attempted to challenge Snegur for the top
job (Crowther and Josanu, 2004). Through a proposed motion of no confidence by his allied
oligarchy parties in the parliament, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma was instrumental in
PM Viktor Yushchenko’s removal due to his popularity in the opinion polls and his enthusi-
asm for market reform and pro-Western attitude (Krushelnycky, 2001).
In sum, this paper proposes a direct measurement of the president’s motivation as if the dual
executives coexist in the period of cohabitation, and the president’s ability as presidential influence
over cabinet survival through the use of his power to dismiss cabinets, dissolve the parliament, and
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An index of prime ministerial autonomy
This paper has thus far argued in favour of a direct measurement of the president’s motivation and
ability, which further influences whether the PM can manage the government’s day-to-day politics
without presidential intervention. This section integrates both factors and develops an index of
prime ministerial autonomy.
A PM has greater room to manoeuvre in the executive affairs of government if the PM can
prevent the president from exercising his constitutional power to intervene. First, if the chances
of the president’s willingness to control the executive branch of the government is given as pm and
that of the president’s ability to do it as pa, the chances of presidential intervention are pm
pa − pm× pa. In other words, the probability that one of the two events will occur is the sum
of the probability of each event minus the probability of the overlap. The extent to which the
PM determines the executive affairs of the government without presidential intervention, con-
versely, is 1 − (pm pa − pm× pa) or (1 − pm)× (1 − pa).2 Second, if the chances that the presi-
dent, through the use of three types of power, exerts influence over cabinet survival and,
accordingly, threatens the government to act on his behalf are depicted as p1, p2, p3, based on
the same rule, the extent of primeministerial autonomy is (1−pm)× (1−p1)× (1−p2)× (1−p3).3
Thus, this paper used a multiplicative aggregation rule to consider the interplay of constitutional
and non-constitutional factors.
The institutional design varies. Some constitutions grant the president a lot of power to dissolve
the cabinet. For example, the president can appoint ministers and discharge them (Iceland, Article
15), or dismiss the federal chancellor or the entire federal government (Austria, Article 70), while
others do not provide the president with such constitutional weapons, such as Bulgaria, Ireland,
and Slovenia. In the 17 semi-presidential democracies analysed in this paper, except Portugal
(1982, Article 198–2) and the Ukraine (2004, Article 87), all constitutions either grant or do
not grant the president the power to terminate the cabinet.4 Thus, I gave a probability of 1 for
the president who can direct such powers against the cabinet without any hindrance, and 0
for otherwise.5
In conceptualising the assembly dissolution powers, Goplerud and Schleiter (2016) captured
five dimensions of variations that jointly define the scope of an actor’s (e.g., president) power,
including the agenda setting role (initial actors), trigger (final actors), collective decision rule, con-
ditionality, and time barriers, thus developing an index of the president’s power to dissolve par-
liament (0–10). I divided the scores by ten for a scale from 0 to 1 to assess the chances of
presidential influence over cabinet survival through the use of such power.
It helps to measure presidential influence over cabinet survival through a proposed motion of
no confidence by his party or allied parties in parliament. Yan (2018) investigated party systems to
measure how the parliament exercises the power to terminate the cabinet by a vote of no confi-
dence. First, he identified four dimensions of institutional variation in multiple steps to launch a
successful vote of no confidence, including the agenda setting role, trigger, collective decision rule,
2It reflects the probability that the president has neither the inclination nor the ability to get involved in the decision-
making process.
3If two events can occur simultaneously, they are said to be non-mutually exclusive events. In other words, there is a certain
probability that the president simultaneously poses a very threat to the survival of government through the use of three types
of power.
4The presidents in both countries have limited power to dismiss the cabinet. In Portugal, the President of the Republic may
dismiss the government only when this becomes necessary to secure the regular functioning of the democratic institution and
after the Council of State has been consulted (see Article 198–2). In the Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada, on the proposal of the
President of the Ukraine, may consider the issue of the responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers and adopt a resolution of
no confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers by the majority of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada (see
Article 87).
5For the two cases, Portugal (1982) and the Ukraine (2004), a probability of 0 is given because the presidents in both
countries do not wield unrestricted power to dismiss the cabinet.
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and conditionality,6 using a probabilistic logic to measure this type of cabinet termination power.
Second, considering real political situations, he assumed that MPs do not act individually but
rather support the policies of their party leadership and vote according to the wishes of their
party.7 Third, he assumed that MPs from parties of coalition cabinets cooperate to vote against
motions of no confidence tabled by opposition parties, reflecting that minority governments are
more likely to die by the parliament’s (or the president’s) hand because of their inherent structural
and political weakness.
For example, in Bulgaria at least one-fifth of MPs (Article 89, that is, 48 of total 240MPs, Article 63)
can submit an interpellation to measure confidence in the government. The parliament can play both
the role of a proposer and a trigger to determine the success or failure of the proposed cabinet termi-
nation, and the probability of a given proposal entering into the decision-making procedures is, thus,
(1) In order to be passed, the motion requires a majority of more than half of the MPs’ votes (Article
89). No conditionality applies in this case. For Borisov’s cabinet (2009–2012), where a single ruling
party GERB (116 seats) faced five opposition parties, KzB (40 seats), DPS (38 seats), Ataka (21 seats),
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Thus, I recorded the scores (0–1) for each cabinet.8
I gave the president who coexisted with the PM of a different ideological orientation a proba-
bility of 0.5, and 0 otherwise. I chose 0.5 instead of 1 to investigate the varying effects of presi-
dential influences over cabinet survival on the extent to which the PM independently manages the
government’s day-to-day politics during the period of cohabitation. More precisely, if 1 is
assigned, the extent of prime ministerial autonomy is 0, showing the same effect where the presi-
dent exerts either more or less influence on the length of the government’s tenure, thus making it
unlikely for the theories to be evaluated empirically.
Based on the operationalisation described above, the extent of prime ministerial autonomy in
Borisov’s cabinet (2009–2012), as an illustrative example, is reflected in the following coding:
The Bulgarian constitution does not provide the president with the power to dismiss the
cabinet: p1= 0.
The Bulgarian constitution does not provide the president with the power to dissolve the
parliament: p2= 0.
6Agenda-setting roles are played by actors who have the power to propose and place cabinet termination on the political
agenda. A trigger is defined as a political actor who can determine the success or failure of the proposed cabinet termination. The
probability of making a resolution is conditioned on an initial actor’s capacity to set this agenda. If an actor plays the roles of both
proposer and trigger, the probability of a given proposal entering the decision-making process is 1. In the case of a vote of no
confidence, the parliament plays both roles. The probability is, thus, 1. The collective decision rule refers to the rule, including
simple majority, absolute majority, and qualified majority, by which triggers achieve internal consensus. Conditionality adds extra
constraints on how actors use constitutional power to dismiss the cabinet, that is, an actor takes a decision upon receiving the assent
of others. For the case of a vote of no confidence, it indicates if a constructive vote of no confidence is adopted.
7Independents were calculated as if they were individual parties with one seat each.
8See Appendix A (online) for more examples.
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The presidential influence over cabinet survival through a proposed motion of no confidence
by his party or allied parties in the parliament: p3= 0.021.
Cohabitation applies in this case, so the chances of the president’s willingness to control the
executive branch of the government: pm= 0.5.
The extent of prime ministerial autonomy is (1 − p1)× (1 − p2)× (1 − p3)× (1 − pm)=
0.490.
Table 1 presents some real cases based on this coding rule. The PM can determine the executive
affairs of the government independently when the president has neither the inclination nor the
ability (case 1, score of 1) or has a very limited ability to intervene (case 3, score of 0.7). The extent
of prime ministerial autonomy, however, falls into the middle range when the president’s willing-
ness increases during the period of cohabitation (cases 2 and 4, scores of 0.5 and 0.35). It drops
abruptly when the president has greater influence over cabinet survival through the use of con-
siderable power to dissolve the parliament (case 5, score of 0.2) or unrestricted power to dismiss
the cabinet (case 7, score of 0) irrespective of the political orientation of both executives (cases 6
and 8, scores of 0.1 and 0). Thus, the index certainly illustrates the extent to which the PM man-
ages the executive affairs of government without presidential intervention.
This new measure has certain advantages over existing indices of presidential power. Scholars
have measured political actors’ power to remove the cabinet through dichotomous measures
(Siaroff, 2003), the use of a 0 to 4 ordinal scale (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Metcalf, 2000), or dif-
ferent weights under various institutional structures (McGregor, 1994; Hellman, 1996; Frye,
1997), which theoretically fails to capture the complexity of the constitution and ignores multiple
paths of cabinet termination, and is empirically not enough to answer questions this article
presents. If an ordinal scale were used, there would remain considerable variation in the levels
of intra-executive conflict across countries where the president is not granted cabinet dismissal
power. Further, these methods fail to provide reasonable justification of weights on presidential
power. Finally, existing additive indices measuring presidential power fail to provide a link be-
tween the different power dimensions of a president’s ability to threaten the government.
Instead, the use of a multiplicative aggregation rule reflects a constraint on a president’s ability
to terminate the cabinet on any one power dimension, thus determining the extent to which the
PM determines the executive affairs of the government without presidential intervention. It also
checks the recurrence of similar problems on the choice of weights and, thus, is more persuasive.
Table 1. Illustrative cases and Expected levels of intra-executive conflicts
The President’s Ability The President’s Motivation Prime Ministerial Autonomy
Expected Levels
of ConflictsCase CAP (p1) ADP (p2) PNC (p3) Cohabitation (pm)
Scores (1 − pm)× (1 − p1)×
(1 − p2)× (1 − p3)
Case 1 0 0 0 0 1 (none) Low
Case 2 0 0 0 0.5 0.5(M) High
Case 3 0 0.3 0 0 0.7 (none) Low
Case 4 0 0.3 0 0.5 0.35 (M) High
Case 5 0 0.8 0 0 0.2 (A) Low
Case 6 0 0.8 0 0.5 0.1 (A&M) Low
Case 7 1 0.4 0 0 0 (A) Low
Case 8 1 1 0 0.5 0 (A&M) Low
Note: CAP, cabinet dismiss power; ADP, assembly dissolution power; PNC, a parliamentary vote of no-confidence; none in parentheses, the
president has neither the ability nor the motivation; M, the president has motivation; A, the president has ability; A&M, the president has both
the ability and the motivation. Case 1: Kostov’s cabinet (1997–2001), Bulgaria; Case 2: Videnov’s cabinet (1995–1997), Bulgaria; Case 3:
Sanader’s cabinet (2003–2006; 2006–2008), Croatia; Case 4: Kosor’s cabinet (2010–2011), Croatia; Case 5: Guterres’s cabinet (1999–2002),
Portugal; Case 6: Barroso’s cabinet (2002–2004), Portugal; Case 7: Fradkov’s cabinet (2004–2007), Russia; Case 8: Oddsson’s cabinet
(1996–1999), Iceland.
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In sum, a more nuanced measure enables scholars to compare presidential influences on securing
the government’s compliance and cooperation.
Research design
First, terms were defined. The unit of analysis was ‘cabinets of semi-presidential democracies’.
This paper used the Polity IV Project9 to define a ‘democracy’ as being the presence of institutions
and procedures by which executive power is checked and through which citizens can express ef-
fective preferences on alternative policies and leaders and, thus, selected countries that maintained
a democracy for at least five years between 1990 and 2015. ‘Semi-presidentialism’ occurs when a
constitution provides for a directly elected fixed-term president and a PM and cabinet collectively
responsible to the legislature (Elgie, 1999). A new ‘cabinet’ is installed whenever there is a change
in the set of parties holding cabinet memberships, a change in PMs, or a parliamentary election
(Müller and Strøm, 2000). Therefore, our data covered 187 cabinets in seventeen semi-presidential
democracies.
The dependent variable was the level of intra-executive conflict. Following Sedelius and
Mashtaler (2013), a dummy variable coded 1 for ‘there had been an observable clash between
the president and the PM and/or between the president and cabinet ministers, manifested through
obstructive or antagonistic behaviour from either side, directed towards the other’ and 0 for no
conflict or only episodic or isolated instances of tensions. This paper determined the level using
the literature, conventional country reports, newspaper articles, and academic blog articles, in-
cluding East European Constitutional Review, Freedom House’s Nations in Transit, Parliaments
and Governments Database, The Political Data Yearbook of the European Journal of Political
Research, Elgie’s two blogs: The Semi-Presidential One and Presidential Power, DELFI by the
Lithuania Tribune, Dziennik Związkowy-Polish Daily News, Independent Balkan News Agency,
Nacional.hr-Dnevno online izdanje, Novinite.com-Sofia News Agency, Prague Post Magazine,
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, The Daily Slovakia, and The Slovenia Times etc.
Some examples demonstrating how such a coding rule works are as follows. President Zeman
criticised PM Sobotka, who sent more troops to Central and Eastern Europe in response to ten-
sions in the Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea. Sobotka took the opposite stance of
Zeman, who said that NATO troops would enter the Ukraine if Russia extended its military oper-
ations outside Crimea. This presents antagonistic behaviour from both sides and, thus, the conflict
level is high. Furthermore, some high-conflict cases show obstructive actions directed towards the
other, such as a presidential veto of a measure of the government to repay foreign governments for
their bailouts (Iceland, President Grimsson), impeachment attempts against the president
(Bulgaria, PM Borissov), refusal to appoint (Romania, President Băsescu) or remove (Portugal,
PM Santana Lopez) cabinet ministers, and a call for a parliamentary vote of no confidence against
the government (Moldova, President Sengur). Appendix B (online) presents the level of intra-
executive conflict in 187 cabinets, and Appendix C summarises the issues of conflict.
As indicated in Sedelius and Mashtaler’s seminal work (2013), this coding rule has not deliv-
ered an absolute and exact criterion for when a conflict is to be considered ‘durable’ enough. For
the purpose of reliability, I compared the results of coding of the level with Protsyk (2006),
Sedelius and Mashtaler (2013), and Elgie (2017), where the last two conducted an expert survey,
finding, except for a very small number of cases, that the results of cases that recorded a value of 0
or 1 were consistent across the four comparative studies.
Next, a list of control variables influencing the levels of intra-executive conflict was added. First,
the president’s personal background may contribute to intra-executive conflicts (Baylis, 1996).
Prior experience as a party leader enables the president to employ party resources to empower
factions and to develop political skills to broker compromises with opposition parties, interact
9Polity IV project: https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
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well with constituencies, and manage relationships with the press or members of parliament from
the same camp, thus making it easier for the president to intervene in executive affairs. Therefore,
I introduced a dummy variable coded 1 for president with experience as a party leader. Second, I
considered the effect of the presidential term. Intra-executive competition either rises with the
newness of their mandates (Elgie, 2017; Köker, 2017) or as presidential elections approach,
due to the presidents’ attempts to control succession (Protsyk, 2006). This paper, thus, added
two dummy variables of which the first term presidency variable was coded 1 for a cabinet that
coexisted with the president during the first year of a presidential term, while the late term presi-
dency variable was given a score of 1 following the same coding rule.
Third, a consolidated democracy decreases the probability of conflict (Protsyk, 2006; Elgie,
2017). Thus, I captured this effect by including the natural log of the age of democracy, which
is calculated as a period starting from the year in which democratic transitions occurred to each
year a new cabinet was formed using Polity IV datasets. Further, the transition variable, a dummy
created where 1= the first popularly elected president after democratisation and 0= otherwise,
was included in the analysis. Finally, following Elgie (2017) and studies of presidential activism
(Neto and Strøm, 2006; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2009b, 2010; Köker, 2017), I included the
effective number of legislative parties and the number of parties in the government from the
ParlGov dataset10 and expected that as the numbers increased, the intra-executive relations would
get more conflict prone. Appendix D presents the descriptive statistics of the variables described
above. I tested to see if prime ministerial autonomy was related to intra-executive conflict through
an inverted U-shaped curve using logistic regression with a robust standard error cluster for
countries.
For robustness, first of all, semi-presidentialism is characterised by not only constitutional het-
erogeneity but also political circumstances as well. Despite the presidents in Austria and Iceland
being granted power to dissolve the parliament and to dismiss the government, they refrained
from intervening in day-to-day politics. Thus, these powers have not been used since 1945
(Elgie, 1999). This study, thus, excluded the effects of the pathway through which the president
could terminate cabinets on the limits to prime ministerial autonomy in both countries, and
changed their index scores.
Second, based on original measurements, when a president poses a very real threat to the sur-
vival of governments through, for instance, the use of cabinet dismissal power, the status of
cohabitation, or not, cannot add this dimension of variation that defines the index of prime min-
isterial autonomy jointly with other dimensions. For example, the 1996 Ukrainian constitution
provides the president with unrestricted power to dismiss the cabinet (p1original= 1), the score
of prime ministerial autonomy is 0 (1 − p1original), regardless of the status of cohabitation
[pm= 0.5, (1 − p1original)× (1 − pm)= 0] or not [pm= 0, (1 − p1original)× (1 − pm)= 0]. This
paper, thus, changed the rule using a penalty factor of 0.05 as a slight constitutional constraint
on the president’s use of such power. The reason for this alternative choice was that it could con-
sider the interplay of constitutional and non-constitutional factors even if the constitution granted
the president much power to end cabinets. In the case of Ukraine, if a penalty factor of
0.05 is added as a constitutional constraint on the president’s use of power to dismiss the cabinet
(p1original= 1, p1new= 0.95), the score of prime ministerial autonomy is 0.05 (1 − p1new), and under
the period of cohabitation, it is reduced to 0.025 [pm= 0.5, (1 − p1new)× (1 − pm)= 0.025], com-
pared to a score of 0.05 if cohabitation were to end [pm= 0, (1 − p1new)× (1 − pm)= 0.05].
Third, the results of coding in this study and the two comparative studies (Protsyk, 2006; Elgie,
2017) cannot arrive at a consensus on a small number of cases that recorded a value of 0 or 1 in the
levels of intra-executive conflict. This paper, thus, changed the values in these cases to arrive at an
agreement.
10ParlGov dataset: http://www.parlgov.org.
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Finally, this paper excluded the case Russia with its questionable levels of democracy – in the
alternative measure (Geddes et al., 2014; Bjørnskov and Rode, 2020) it was a non-democracy. This
is because a dictator serving as a president rewards loyalty by recruitment to the cabinet, which
can be reshuffled with ease, thus raising the head of government’s willingness to comply with the
president’s action.
Results
Figure 2 presents the relationship between prime ministerial autonomy and intra-executive con-
flict as an inverted U-shaped curve. Based on the results of the univariate regression analyses,
while the probability of confrontations between the dual executives is approximately 0.15 with
scores of prime ministerial autonomy at 0, it becomes 0.36 with a score of 0.5. Further, when
the scores of prime ministerial autonomy reach 0.8 and 1, the predicted probability of conflict
drops to 0.24 and 0.11, respectively. Similarly, Figure 2 verifies the inverted U-shaped relationship
through the addition of controls and a test of robustness.
Test of causal mechanism: quantitative analysis
If my theoretical argument is true, we can expect that a president’s willingness to control the ex-
ecutive branch during a period of cohabitation will increase intra-executive competition only in
semi-presidential democracies where the president cannot pose a threat to cabinet survival. To test
this, the interaction term was computed as: ‘cohabitation× presidential influences over cabinet
survival’, where cohabitation is a dummy variable, 1= cohabitation and 0= otherwise, and pres-
idential influences over cabinet survival is a continuous one (0–1), identifying a multi-pathway
cabinet termination and measuring the chances of a president’s use of power to dissolve the gov-
ernment. The study used a multiplicative aggregation rule to link the three paths that a president
could initiate to end the cabinet, that is, the use of cabinet dismissal power, assembly dissolution
power, or through his party or allied parties in the parliament, the use of a motion of no confi-
dence. Similarly, I also controlled for the seven variables mentioned previously.
Figure 3 provides strong support for the causal mechanism. In semi-presidential democracies
where the president cannot pose a threat to cabinet survival, when compared to their counterparts
where the president has the final say on the government’s survival, cohabitation increases the
chances of confrontation between both political actors. Further, in contrast with the period of
cohabitation, this effect is not identified in situations in which the president and the PM of
the same political orientation coexist, confirming my theoretical expectations that no matter
how much influence the president has on early government termination, conflict is not frequent
when both actors share the same ideological orientation.
Figure 4 shows the conditional effects of cohabitation on the predicted probability of intra-
executive conflict. The difference in the effects between the cohabitation and non-cohabitation
groups decreases with the values of presidential influence over cabinet survival. Therefore, it lines
up with the argument that the greater a president’s influence on cabinet termination, the lower the
level of intra-executive conflicts, irrespective of the political orientation of both executives.
Test of causal mechanism: csQCA
The second method used in this study was qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Developed by
Charles Ragin (2008), QCA is a configurational method that seeks to explore the relationship be-
tween the combination of ‘conditions’ and ‘outcomes’. QCA is also a technique designed for small-
N or intermediate-N research, a synthesis of in-depth insight across cases and the generalisation of
multiple causal paths, and combines the best features of the case-oriented approach with those of
the variable-oriented approach (Ragin, 2008). Three types of QCA are widely applied, and this
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study chooses crisp-sets QCA (dichotomous variable, csQCA) because all the conditions and out-
come factors are bivalent (Thiem, 2014).
The csQCA method hinges on the logic of Boolean algebra. By Rihoux and De Meur’s (2009)
standard operating procedure, first, the researcher must construct a dichotomous data table, con-
sisting of 0 or 1 attributed to conditions and outcomes. Based on that, a truth table or the table of
configurations – a given outcome corresponding to the combination of conditions – is produced.
After addressing the possible contradictory configurations, the key step, Boolean minimisation, is
run to find the complex, intermediate-to-parsimonious formula that will be interpreted by the
researcher afterwards.
In this study, there were 187 cases. The outcome variable, CONFLICT, is already of a dichoto-
mous nature, where 1= higher levels of intra-executive conflict and 0= otherwise. We have four
bivalent conditions, of which COHABIT captures whether the president represents a different
party to the PM, and whether the president’s party is absent from government. The other three
reflect the degree to which the PM controls executive power. That is, DISPARL delineates the
president’s power of initiating the dissolution process by simply and directly placing such a mo-
tion on the political agenda, and thus, dissolving the parliament at his own will; DISCAB records
whether the president can dismiss ministers without the consent of the assembly. NOCONF is
coded 1 when the government formed by a party or coalition of parties, does not have a majority
of overall seats in the parliament, and the MPs use the simple majority rule to determine that the
government is no longer deemed fit to hold that position.
The truth table shows that some configurations are associated with a negative outcome (0),
while others are associated with a contradictory outcome in which cases are coded 1 on the
Figure 2. Prime ministerial autonomy and intra-executive conflicts.
Note: Based on the models reported in Columns 1 and 4 of supplementary Table 1, Appendix E. Upper-left panel: model 1, upper-right
panel: model 2, lower-left panel: model 3, lower-right panel: model 4.
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outcome of interest and others are 0 (Appendix F-1). Resolving contradictory configurations
is a vital issue that can be achieved using statistical methods that compare the distribution of
outcomes between specific configurations and others (Roscigno and Hodson, 2004), or quasi-
sufficiency, which assigns the outcome to the contradictory configurations in which the majority
of cases appear (Skaaning, 2011).
Further, in the truth table, there are some logically possible configurations in which non-
observable cases fit, which are defined as logical remainders. Conventionally, there are three strat-
egies to tackle this problem. A conservative approach is to treat all logical remainders as false,
while the other strategy treats them as don’t care to generate the most parsimonious formula.
However, the first approach leads to formulae that are too complex for a theoretically meaningful
interpretation, but the second one includes some logical remainders without theoretical or em-
pirical support. A third approach, based on so-called easy counterfactuals, is in line with the exist-
ing knowledge that the presence (or absence) of conditions is linked to outcome 0 or 1, and finds a
solution term of intermediate complexity (Ragin and Sonnett, 2004). Standards of good practice in
QCA produce and report three formulae: complex, intermediate, and the most parsimonious
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2010).
As for the robustness check, one way to test if similar results emerge is through a reduction,
addition, or replacement of explanatory factors (Skaaning, 2011). Supplementary Table 1 shows
that intra-executive conflict in democracies decreases over time after the transition to democracy.
This leads to an expectation that this type of conflict will increase in post-communist countries
where their political systems are more unstable when compared to the six consolidated democra-
cies of Austria, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, and Portugal. This paper, therefore, added the
Figure 3. Presidential influences over cabinet survival, cohabitation and intra-executive conflicts.
Note: Left panel: no control model (the slope for cohabitation group: −0.448**, for non-cohabitation group: −0.159), right panel: control
model (the slope for cohabitation group: −0.238*, for non-cohabitation group: −0.061). *P< 0.1, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01.
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other causal condition, LONGDEMO, where 1= consolidated democracies and 0= otherwise,
which is supposed to explain the degree of conflict within the executive branch. Another way
to check the robustness is to change the calibration thresholds (Skaaning, 2011; Glaesser and
Cooper, 2014). Goplerud and Schleiter (2016) developed a detailed index of assembly dissolution
power for all the relevant actors (0–10). For this continuous explanatory factor in the raw data,
this paper chose alternative breakpoints, namely, power scores for the president larger than 4, to
separate some cases from others. The final method is to change the frequency thresholds
(Skaaning, 2011). In the original analysis, this study used all configurations representing at least
one case, but in the robustness analysis, the frequency thresholds are raised to two cases
(Appendix F-2).
As shown in Table 2, when considering the conditions of cohabitation and three conditions
influencing how the PM controls the executive power, the analysis found that the combination
of cohabitation and one of three conditions accounts for intra-executive conflict (COHABIT *
[disparl  discab  noconf] → CONFLICT). Two types of causal combinations of the four con-
ditions were identified in a large proportion of the complex and intermediate formula. One is
COHABIT * disparl * discab * noconf → CONFLICT, while the other is COHABIT * discab *
noconf → CONFLICT, all showing one of the causal mechanisms as true when different partisan
affiliations of presidents and cabinets must coexist with each other [COHABIT] and the president
has less influence over cabinet survival [disparl * discab * noconf  discab * noconf], it is more
likely for the PM not to cooperate but to scramble for control of the executive branch of govern-
ment with the president [CONFLICT].
The same procedure was used to obtain the formula for the [0] configurations:csQCA provides
us with two causal paths to the [0] outcome. One is cohabit * [DISPARL noconf : : : ]→ conflict,
Figure 4. The conditional effects of cohabitation on the predicted probability of intra-executive conflicts.
Note: Left panel: no control model, right panel: control model.
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Table 2. Prime minister’s control of the executive, cohabitation, and intra-executive conflicts: csQCA
Resolving Contradictory Configurations
50% threshold 60% threshold
Ratios of configuration to
non-configuration percentages
Original C[1]: COHABIT * discab * noconf C[1]: COHABIT * disparl * discab * noconf C[1]: COHABIT * discab * noconf
P[1]: COHABIT * discab * noconf P[1]: COHABIT * disparl * noconf P[1]: COHABIT * discab * noconf
C[0]: cohabit * noconf  COHABIT * DISPARL *
DISCAB  disparl * discab * NOCONF
C[0]: cohabit * noconf  COHABIT * DISPARL *
DISCAB DISPARL* noconf  disparl * discab *
NOCONF
C[0]: COHABIT * DISPARL * DISCAB  disparl *
discab * NOCONF  cohabit * DISPARL *
discab * noconf




C[1]: COHABIT * disparl * discab * noconf *
longdemo  COHABIT * DISPARL * discab *
noconf * LONGDEMO
C[1]: COHABIT * disparl* discab * noconf *
longdemo
C[1]: COHABIT * disparl * discab * noconf *
longdemo
I[1]: COHABIT * disparl * discab * noconf *
longdemo  COHABIT * DISPARL * discab *
LONGDEMO
I[1]: COHABIT * disparl * discab * noconf *
longdemo
I[1]: COHABIT * disparl * discab * noconf *
longdemo
P[1]: COHABIT * longdemo  COHABIT * DISPARL
* discab
P[1]: COHABIT * longdemo P[1]: COHABIT * longdemo
C[0]: disparl * discab * LONGDEMO  cohabit *
DISPARL* noconf *
LONDGDEMO COHABIT * DISPARL * DISCAB *
LONGDEMO cohabit * disparl * noconf *
longdemo
C[0]: DISPARL * noconf * LONGDEMO  disparl *
discab * LONGDEMO COHABIT *
DISPARL * DISCAB * LONGDEMO  cohabit *
disparl * noconf * longdemo
C[0]: COHABIT * DISPARL * DISCAB *
LONGDEMO  cohabit * disparl * noconf *
LONDEMO  disparl * discab *
NOCONF * LONGDEMO
I[0]: disparl * discab * LONGDEMO  cohabit *
DISPARL * noconf  COHABIT * DISPARL *
DISCAB  cohabit * noconf * longdemo 
cohabit * disparl * longdemo
I[0]: DISPARL * noconf  disparl * discab *
LONGDEMO COHABIT * DISPARL * DISCAB co-
habit * noconf * longdemo  cohabit * disparl
* longdemo
I[0]: COHABIT * DISPARL * DISCAB  cohabit *
disparl * noconf * LONDEMO  disparl *
discab * NOCONF
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Table 2. (Continued )
Resolving Contradictory Configurations
50% threshold 60% threshold




C[1]: COHABIT * disparl * discab * noconf C[1]: COHABIT * disparl * discab * noconf C[1]: COHABIT * discab * noconf
P[1]: COHABIT * disparl P[1]: COHABIT * disparl P[1]: COHABIT * discab * noconf
C[0]: cohabit * noconf  COHABIT * DISPARL
DISPARL * discab
C[0]: cohabit * noconf  COHABIT * DISPARL
DISPARL * discab
C[0]: DISPARL * discab *
NOCONF COHABIT * DISPARL * DISCAB
cohabit * DISPARL * noconf
C[0]: DISPARL * DISCAB *
noconfCOHABIT * DISPARL * DISCAB cohabit
* DISPARL * discab
P[0]: cohabit  DISPARL P[0]: cohabit  DISPARL P[0]: NOCONF  cohabit *
DISPARL COHABIT * DISCAB
P[0]: NOCONF  cohabit *




C[1]: COHABIT * discab * noconf C[1]: COHABIT * disparl * discab * noconf C[1]: COHABIT * discab * noconf
P[1]: COHABIT * discab * noconf P[1]: COHABIT * disparl * noconf P[1]: COHABIT * discab * noconf
C[0]: cohabit * noconf  DISPARL * DISCAB *
noconf  disparl * discab * NOCONF
C[0]: cohabit * noconf  DISPARL* noconf  dis-
parl * discab * NOCONF
C[0]: COHABIT * DISPARL * DISCAB  disparl *
discab * NOCONF  cohabit * DISPARL *
discab * noconf
P[0]: cohabit  DISCAB NOCONF P[0]: cohabit  DISCAB NOCONF P[0]: NOCONF COHABIT * DISCAB  cohabit *
DISPARL * discab
Note: C[1]: complex formula for the [1] outcome, I[1]: intermediate formula for the [1] outcome, P[1]: parsimonious formula for the [1] outcome. To find the intermediate formula, this study applied a more rational
assumption that the presence of consolidated democracies (Elgie, 2017: 137), as ‘easy’ counterfactual, as Ragin and Sonnett suggested, is associated with lower levels of intra-executive conflict (LD{1}→ O{0}), and the
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illustrating that no matter the extent to which a president poses a threat to the survival of gov-
ernment [DISPARL  noconf : : : ], in the case of non-cohabitation [cohabit], intra-executive
competition is rare [conflict]. The other is COHABIT * DISPARL * DISCAB→ conflict. It is read
as follows: ‘During the period of cohabitation [COHABIT] in all semi-presidential democracies
where presidential influence on cabinet termination is higher [DISPARL * DISCAB], relations be-
tween the president and the PM are peaceful [conflict].’ When some logical remainders are in-
cluded to obtain the parsimonious formula, a large proportion of causal combinations of the four
conditions is cohabit DISPARLDISCABNOCONF→ conflict. This confirms our theoret-
ical expectations: intra-executive confrontations decrease when the president and the cabinet
share an ideological orientation or the president has greater room to manoeuvre when determin-
ing cabinet survival. Compared to the path COHABIT * [disparl discab noconf] covering the
observed [1] outcome cases, we found that this type of path was not associated with the [0]
outcome.
Discussion
This article answers why intra-executive conflict varies across semi-presidential democracies.
Some scholars conclude that intra-executive competition tends to be higher when the president
holds less power to dismiss the cabinet (Protsyk, 2005a; Protsyk, 2006; Sedelius and Mashtaler,
2013), while Elgie (2017) confirms the positive effects of presidential power on the likelihood of
intra-executive conflict. This study’s findings, however, show that presidential influence over cab-
inet survival is a significant predictor of intra-executive conflict. Further, research confirms that
cohabitation is more prone to intra-executive conflict (Protsyk, 2005a; Protsyk, 2006; Sedelius and
Mashtaler, 2013), which is conditioned on a broad scope of presidential constitutional power
(Elgie, 2017). The study further shows that the effects of cohabitation on the chances of an
intra-executive conflict depend on the president’s ability to threaten cabinet survival. Finally,
the study integrates the above factors to construct an index of prime ministerial autonomy, con-
firming that its relationship with the probability of intra-executive conflict is represented by an
inverted U-shaped curve. This argument is not entirely new, as existing research shows an inverse
relationship between the strength of presidential powers to dismiss and the level of intra-executive
conflict and conditional effects of cohabitation on intra-executive relationships. This study con-
tributes to this relationship, considering the interplay of constitutional and non-constitutional
factors, with focus on the president’s ability to threaten a cabinet’s survival. Table 3 summarises
the comparisons between previous findings and present results.
The only incentive to motivate a president to enter into conflict in this model is cohabitation. It
would certainly add value if the paper would have engaged in other motivational mechanisms, for
example by looking more closely into cases where cohabitation is not the main cause of conflict.
Based on the results of the regression model, two motivational factors – the president with experi-
ence as a party leader and age of democracy – had significant effects on the likelihood of conflict
(Appendix E). The study removed the cohabitation condition from the model and replaced it with
the two other motivational factors for causal explanation. However, this account offers a far less
precise explanation of intra-executive conflict than the cohabitation condition, leaving more cases
under-explained (Appendix F-3). In addition, it accounts for only a few deviant cases when in-
cluded as the other causal condition in conjunction with the cohabitation condition (Appendix F-
4). Despite cohabitation proving to be a significant institutional factor predicting intra-executive
conflict, future research should consider individual-level determinants of presidents’ motivations
to open war against premiers.
This study confirmed that the relationship between prime ministerial autonomy and intra-
executive conflict is represented by an inverted U-shaped curve. A fundamental point merits
further discussion. The findings are somewhat skewed by two exceptional cases of president-
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Table 3. The comparisons between previous findings and present results
Protsyk (2006) Sedelius and Mashtaler (2013) Elgie (2017) Present Results
Number of Semi-presidential
Regimes
8 8 14 17
Period 1991–2002 1991–2011 1995–2015 1990–2015
Number of cabinets 67 76 139 187
Methods Descriptive statistics Descriptive statistics Quantitative, csQCA, case
studies
Quantitative, csQCA
Findings COHABIT  discab → CONFLICT COHABIT  discab → CONFLICT COHABIT * PRESPOWER →
CONFLICT




autonomy R conflict =
an inverted U curve
Speak to this study’s
findings
On the left side of the curve: intra-
executive confrontations decrease
when the president has greater room
to manoeuvre when determining cabi-
net survival
On the left side of the curve: intra-
executive confrontations decrease
when the president has greater room
to manoeuvre when determining cabi-
net survival
The effects of cohabitation on the
chances of an intra-executive
conflict depend on presidential
constitutional power
-
This study’s findings contrib-
ute to existing research
1. The interplay of constitutional and
non-constitutional factors
1. The interplay of constitutional and
non-constitutional factors
A focus on the president’s ability
to threaten cabinet survival in-
stead of a broad scope of presi-
dential constitutional power
-
2. A nuanced measure of the president’s
ability to threaten cabinet survival
2. A nuanced measure of the president’s
ability to threaten cabinet survival
Note: COHABIT, the period of cohabitation; discab, the president without cabinet dismissal power; PRESPOWER, the president is granted much power; presinfluence, the president has less influence over cabinet
survival through the use of his power to dismiss cabinet, dissolve the parliament, and propose a parliamentary vote of no confidence by his or allied parties; CONFLICT, the presence of intra-executive conflict.: or;
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parliamentarism: Austria and Iceland, where presidents perceive their roles as political arbiters
and only to act as political leaders when the prevailing political system does not work.
Further, one case where the president has unilateral cabinet dismissal powers in this dataset is
Russia, which has questionable levels of democracy. Our theoretical expectations were still con-
firmed excluding the three cases mentioned above, while doing so it does leave the lower left end of
the inverted U-curve covered by empirical data on the Ukraine’s cabinets (1996–2006). Future
research should include more cases of president–parliamentary democracies outside Europe to
test the proposition: for example, Taiwan is a case where strong presidents always handpick pre-
miers, thus mitigating intra-executive competition (Wu and Tsai, 2011).
Our results imply that a higher or lower extent of prime ministerial autonomy tends to reduce
the likelihood of intra-executive conflict. At least two policy implications may follow. First, schol-
ars of semi-presidentialism may pay close attention to institutional design as the president’s power
to terminate the cabinet can ensure the PM’s compliance, and, accordingly, ease the conflict.
However, semi-presidential regimes, where a powerful president can unilaterally dismiss the cab-
inet, generally have a worse democratic performance (Elgie, 2011b; Kim, 2015; Sedelius and Linde,
2018). In the bigger scheme of things, intra-executive conflict may be preferable to presidential
overreach. Second, efforts to shape peaceful intra-executive relations by reducing presidential in-
fluence over cabinet survival might be more effective if the use of such a strategy is conditional on
the electoral system facilitating the coexistence of president and PM of the same political orien-
tation. Although previous studies have questioned whether cohabitation poses any serious threat
to democracy (Kirschke, 2007; Elgie, 2010; Kim, 2015), there is no evidence that the period of
united executive is more susceptible to democratic failure. In sum, an effective institutional design
to lower the extent of intra-executive confrontation should favour greater prime ministerial
autonomy.
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